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1.  Obligation and its place in morality 
 
Moral obligation or duty is a part of morality that is directive. We communicate 
obligations to direct people into doing what is right - what is morally obligatory or 
required as a matter of duty - and away from what is morally wrong. The direction 
given is demanding. And this demandingness seems linked to a criticism that is 
distinctively condemnatory. People who breach moral obligations and who do so 
without excuse are subject to blame. And the content of blame is that they are 
morally responsible for having done wrong.  
 
This moral responsibility seems importantly different from anything invoked in 
ordinary rational criticism. We can be subject to rational criticism for our general 
attitudes as well as for our actions. Fears, wants and other passions and emotions 
can be foolish or sensible. But moral responsibility is commonly understood to be 
specifically for action and omission. We can only be morally responsible for our 
actions and missions and their consequences, and not - unless indirectly, as 
consequences of our own prior action - for the feelings and emotions that come 
over us. And just as moral responsibility is for action, so too are the moral 
obligations that we are responsible for keeping. We can only be under a moral 
obligation to act or to refrain from action - not to experience desires or to have 
feelings.  
 
Morality shares the language of obligation, responsibility and blame with positive 
law - the law contingently legislated by political authorities for the specific human 
communities subject to their jurisdiction. 'You have an obligation to pay the 
money' could be said by a moralist asserting a moral obligation - or by a judge or 
state official asserting a legal obligation, that is an obligation under some system 
of positive law. And just as one can be under obligations that are legal as well as 
moral, so one can be held legally as well as morally responsible, and legally as 
well as morally to blame.  
 
Besides this shared language of obligation and responsibility linking morality with 
positive law, there seems to be a shared directive function. It is very natural to 
think that in imposing legal obligations positive law likewise serves to direct 
human action and thereby the various outcomes that can be produced or prevented 
through human action. And there is an historically influential view of how, at least 
in the case of positive legal obligation, this action-directive function operates. 
 
According to this view, positive legal direction, at least when effective, is of the 
voluntary - those outcomes that are subject to our will or decision, and that we 
produce or prevent by our own agency, through deciding so to do. The law makes 
a certain outcome - that our car not be parked on a double yellow line - legally 
obligatory, and threatens sanctions should this outcome not arise. We are 
motivated, either by a concern to be law-abiding, or, as often, by a further dislike 
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of the sanctions, to decide to do what is required to ensure the obligatory outcome. 
And so we act on the basis of that decision to produce the outcome and avoid the 
sanctions. 
 
That morality shares a language of obligation and responsibility with the positive 
law, and that both moral and legal obligations seem alike directive of action, has 
long suggested the idea that in obligation morality too contains a form of law - a 
specifically moral law. Behind this conception of a specifically moral law stands 
an idea of law in general. Law, according to this conception, is any system of 
obligations as demanding directives on action, addressing a distinctive 
responsibility for meeting those obligations, a responsibility that we are supposed 
to possess for action and omission and its outcomes. Law addresses us as 
peculiarly responsible for what we do, and demands that we exercise that 
responsibility to do what is right and to avoid doing what is wrong. Direction by 
law so understood is distinct from the application of more general normative 
principles. Law is to be distinguished from more general principles of reason - 
principles that are merely advisory, and that presuppose no special responsibility 
for how we act, but serve to appraise attitudes and emotions generally simply as 
reasonable or unreasonable.  
 
How might morality, in particular, take the form of action-directive law? One 
approach is to apply an understanding of positive legal obligation to the moral case 
as well. For if moral obligation might seem puzzling and in need of explanation, 
we are all too familiar with legal obligations and systems of humanly created 
positive law. Why not use the familiar positive case to model the moral case? A 
moral obligation is a moral directive that functions as a moral version of a legal 
obligation. The account would then proceed by selecting those salient aspects of 
legal direction that seem most plausibly to admit of some form of moral 
equivalent, and use them to identify what is constitutive of moral obligation. To 
characterise moral obligation in this way is to propose what I shall term a 
positivising model of moral obligation. 
 
Positivising models of moral obligation can take a variety of forms. We might, for 
example, characterise moral obligations as moral directives that, like legal 
obligations, are the decrees of some appropriate law-giving authority - in the case 
of moral obligation, a specifically moral authority above any human legal 
authority, and that governs humanity generally, such as God. Just as to deny the 
very existence of a legislative authority is also to deny the existence of the legal 
obligations dependent on its authority, so denying the existence of such a moral 
legislator is to deny the very existence of moral obligations. For Elizabeth 
Anscombe, absent continued belief in God as divine lawgiver, all we are left with 
in morality is a metaphorical use of the term ‘obligation’; we must give up belief 
in the literal reality of moral obligatoriness. The term 'moral obligation', she 
claimed, will now be empty, without any further literal application. Moral 
obligatoriness can no more exist without the divine decrees that constitute it than 
can criminality without the institution of criminal law:  
 
But if a [divine command] conception is dominant for many centuries, and then is 
given up, it is a natural result that the concepts of ‘obligation’, of being bound or 
required as by a law, should remain though they had lost their root…it is as if the 
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notion ‘criminal’ were to remain when criminal courts had been abolished and 
forgotten… Elizabeth Anscombe ‘Modern moral philosophy’ in Roger Crisp 
and Michael Slote eds. Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1997), p. 31 
 
But positivising models can take secular form as well. The existence of moral 
obligations need not be tied to some form of theism. We might instead take moral 
obligations to be directives backed by some form of sanction, imposed if not by a 
moral legislator, at least by members of any community where the moral 
obligation applies.  
 
Thus Bernard Williams characterises moral obligations as, properly understood, 
directing us to meet standards of voluntary behaviour that matter socially. Moral 
obligation 
 
is grounded in the basic issue of what people should be able to rely on. People 
must rely as far as possible on not being killed or used as a resource, and on 
having some space and objects and relations with other people that they can count 
as their own. It also serves their interests if, to some extent at least, they can count 
on not being lied to. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 
(London: Fontana 1985) p. 185 
 
So the standards on voluntary action which protect these vital interests are 
properly classed as morally obligatory, and are reinforced by social pressure - the 
appropriateness of some kind of reinforcing pressure being, on this view, of the 
essence of obligation in all its forms. Our ethical training is designed to leave us 
strongly motivated towards performing those actions which count as morally 
obligatory, and away from those which count as wrong and forbidden. We are left 
concerned to do what is obligatory and to avoid doing what is wrong, and then 
through this concern thoughts about moral obligation motivate us voluntarily to do 
what is obligatory as a means to complying with our moral obligations. So the 
pressure that comes with moral obligatoriness enforces and encourages a certain 
practical conclusion - a concern to do what is morally obligatory: 
 
…moral obligation is expressed in one especially important kind of deliberative 
conclusion - a conclusion that is directed toward what to do...The fact that moral 
obligation is a kind of practical conclusion explains several of its features. An 
obligation applies to someone with respect to an action - it is an obligation to do 
something…  Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy pp. 174-5 
 
The central form of social pressure is blame, whether communicated from without, 
by others, or once one is trained socially, communicated from within, by oneself to 
oneself in self-blame and remorse. Blame, like obligation-enforcing pressure 
generally, is likewise directed at the voluntary: 
 
…blame always tends to share the particularized, practical character of moral 
obligation in the technical sense. Its negative reaction is focused closely on an action 
or omission, and this is what is blamed. Moreover – although there are many 
inevitable anomalies in its actual working - the aspiration of blame is that it should 
apply only to the extent that the undesired outcome is the product of voluntary action 




Positivising models of moral obligation have important implications for the place 
of moral obligation within wider morality. For besides moral obligation there is 
another aspect to morality. This involves the appraisal as morally admirable or 
contemptible in various ways, not only of people's actions, but of their characters, 
inclinations and dispositions too. This is the part of morality that is concerned with 
virtues and vices. And a positivising view of moral obligation tends to distance 
moral obligation from the morality of virtue and vice. For standards of virtue and 
vice seem not to depend on any legislation, or on the availability of sanctions to 
enforce them. And virtues or vices, such as courageousness or temperance, do not 
seem voluntary or subject to the will as are the actions and outcomes that, on the 
positivising model, are subject to legal direction. We do not acquire courage, say, 
just by deciding to, on receipt of some directive to be courageous. If moral 
obligation is understood to involve a form of action-directive law, and then the 
morally legal direction it involves is understood on the basis of natural models of 
positive law, it will seem that moral obligation is very different from the general 
morality of virtue and vice. Moral obligation will seem to form a distinctive part of 
morality with a special concern of its own - the direction of the voluntary - and to 
depend on special elements, such as sanctions and legislation, that are quite 
inessential to virtue and vice.  
 
Hume assumed that the idea of moral obligation as a form of action-directive law 
was a deep mistake just because, in his view, no part of morality, the morality of 
obligation and blame properly understood being included by him in this, involved 
any kind of sanction-backed direction of the voluntary. The supposition otherwise 
was the invention of theologians, who had tried to remodel moral obligation and 
blame on the basis of some sort of fictitious cosmic version of positive law: 
 
Philosophers, or rather divines under that disguise, treating all morals as on a like 
footing with civil laws, guarded by sanctions of reward and punishment, were 
necessarily led to render this circumstance, of voluntary or involuntary, the 
foundation of their whole theory…but this, in mean time, must be allowed, that 
sentiments are every day experienced of blame and praise, which have objects 
beyond the dominion of the will or choice, and of which it behoves us, if not as 
moralists, as speculative philosophers at least, to give some satisfactory theory and 
explication.  David Hume An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 
P.H. Nidditch ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975), Appendix IV, 'Of some 
verbal disputes' p. 322 
 
In Hume's view, wrongful breach of moral obligation or duty – moral 'crime' - is 
not anything like positive legal crime. Moral ‘crime’ is not the violation of some 
sanction-backed directive on the voluntary, but is simply a failure to meet a 
standard of admirability, a standard moreover that immediately applies not to 
voluntary actions, but to non-voluntary states of motivation and character.  
 
A blemish, a fault, a vice, a crime; these expressions seem to denote different 
degrees of censure and disapprobation; which are, however, all of them, at the 
bottom, pretty nearly of the same kind or species. An Enquiry Concerning the 




One violates natural duty in morality as a parent, not just through failing to look 
after one's children, but by lacking a natural affection or care for them. This, in 
Hume's view, is the fundamental moral wrong, a failure of non-voluntary 
motivation, of which the neglect of children at the point of the voluntary is but a 
symptom or effect. 
 
We blame a father for neglecting his child. Why? because it shows a want of natural 
affection, which is the duty of every parent. Were not natural affection a duty, care of 
children cou'd not be a duty; and 'twere impossible we cou'd have the duty in our eye 
in the attention we give to our offspring. David Hume, A Treatise of Human 
Nature, P.H. Nidditch ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978) p. 478 
 
So a positivising understanding of what moral law would involve can, as with 
Hume, lead to a rejection of the very idea of moral obligation or duty as action-
directive law. Or else, as with Anscombe and Williams, who despite his 
admiration for Hume, reasoned here as one of Hume's 'divines' in philosophical 
disguise, that positivising understanding can still leave moral obligation something 
action-directive. But then, since it is taken to resemble positive law in its directive 
function, the morality of obligation is viewed as detached from and importantly 
different from the morality of virtue and vice.  
 
But this view of how moral obligation might take the form of action-directive law 
is very debatable, and alien to an important part of the Catholic intellectual 
tradition. In late medieval and early modern Catholicism, moral obligation was 
certainly conceived as action-directive law. But it was not conceived as different 
in its basis from the morality of virtue and vice. Rather the morality of obligation 
was part of the morality of virtue and vice. Moral law was, in effect, the morality 
of virtue and vice as concerned not with morally admirable or disadmirable 
characteristics in general, but those parts of the morally admirable and 
disadmirable that fell within our control. Moral obligation was the morality of 
virtue and vice as it applied to our exercise of freedom - a power to determine 
what we do that applies in particular to how we exercise the will itself as well as to 
what is subject to the will and voluntary. 
 
This very different view of moral obligation as a form of law should not be a 
surprise. For besides positivising theories of moral obligation, there is also the 
natural law tradition. And the natural law tradition takes a very different view of 
moral law. Far from moral law being understood on the model of positive law, for 
the natural law tradition moral law is a form of law that is importantly prior to law 
in positive form. Moral law is a demanding form of moral direction that comes 
with our human nature. Whereas positive law is a secondary form of law that when 
it does its proper job, serves to extend the force of moral law, and to render its 
requirements more specific, in ways that serve ends of personal and communal 
happiness and justice that the moral law requires us to pursue. 
 
Because positive law is a secondary and special form of law, many features of it 
may go beyond what is required for the legal direction of action in itself, and may 
not apply to moral law. So legislative origin, the involvement of sanctions, a 
special concern with direction of the specifically voluntary - these features of 
positive law may not apply to the moral law at all; and yet moral obligation may 
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still be demandingly directive of a distinctive responsibility for action, just as any 
genuine law must be. 
 
In the moral theory of late scholasticism, we find a systematic defence of moral 
obligation as embodying natural law that radically distances moral obligation from 
positive legal obligation, and that does so by assimilating moral obligation to a 
special case of a wider morality of virtue and vice. Central to this approach is a 
distinctive approach to a fundamental problem within the theory of normativity - 
the problem of the relation of normative direction to normative appraisal. 
 
 
2. Normativity - direction and appraisal 
 
We can distinguish two aspects to normativity.  First, there is a directive function.  
Standards that are normative for us may possess a directive role.  They may point 
us in a given direction or support us taking it; and are strongly directive when they 
point us in that direction and away from any other - when they not only support A, 
but oppose any contrary B. And as directive, normative standards address a 
capacity to respond to that direction - to register or cognize the direction being 
given, and to respond to and follow that direction, or at least attempt to. 
 
But secondly there is an appraisive aspect to normativity. People who meet or 
exceed standards that are normative may be praised or judged favourably for 
having done so; while those who breach or fail to meet the standards may be 
criticized or judged unfavourably for this failure. So besides any capacity we 
might have to register direction and respond to it, there are the capacities and 
activities that normative standards serve to appraise. Besides providing various 
kinds of direction, normative standards support various forms of appraisal; and 
there may be a variety in the kinds of normativity corresponding to the different 
sorts of capacity and activity appraised. 
 
These two aspects to normativity, the directive and the appraisive, are importantly 
distinct. Obviously, there can be standards of appraisal that apply to objects that 
cannot be directed. A vase's goodness has to do with its form and utility, not with 
its responsiveness to any form of direction. And even as humans the capacities for 
which we are appraised need not have much to with our responsiveness to 
direction either. People are praised for being amusing or for being inventive. But 
neither talent need be easily subject to direction or much dependent on 
receptiveness to direction. At the same time standards may serve to give direction 
without supporting much by way of appraisal of those being directed: consider an 
instruction manual. Obviously one could use the manual as a basis for appraising 
people in terms of whether they followed it correctly or not. But this would be 
vastly peripheral to the main point of the manual - which is simply to provide a set 
of directions. 
 
Ethical standards give direction. They guide us to do what is right and good, and to 
avoid what is wrong and bad. But they also serve as a very important basis of 
appraisal both of actions and of the agents who perform them, and in a way that 
seems profoundly connected to direction. The term 'a good thing to do' may 
communicate a directive in support of performing the action in question. But the 
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term 'good' also serves favorably to appraise the action, as well as to appraise the 
agent who performs it. If the action is a good thing to do, it may have been good of 
the agent to perform it. The combination of the directive and the appraisive is 
central to ethical standards as we ordinarily understand them. But how to relate the 
appraisive and directive in morality? 
 
Is direction primary? In which case understanding ethical standards begins with 
the basic notion of a directive to do something; and appraisal is then explained in 
terms of the theory of direction: the capacity addressed by ethical standards is 
simply the capacity to receive and respond to ethical direction, and ethical 
appraisal of agents is then for whether they follow ethical directives or not. Or 
perhaps direction is not primary. Perhaps the appraisive side of ethical standards 
should be viewed as in certain respects importantly independent of and even 
explanatory of the directive. It may be that ethical appraisal is of capacities that go 
significantly beyond the capacity to respond to ethical direction. And these further 
capacities and their ethical significance may then inform and shape not only 
ethical appraisal but even the use of ethical terms to give direction. 
 
In recent philosophy the prevalent assumption has been that quite generally, or at 
least in the moral sphere, normativity is identical with reason. Standards that are 
normative for us, it is assumed, are just standards that it is reasonable for us to 
meet. Indeed, the identity of normativity with reason is typically presented as if it 
were trivial or obvious. Thus Joseph Raz: 
 
Aspects of the world are normative in as much as they or their existence constitute 
reasons for persons, that is, grounds which make certain beliefs, moods, emotions, 
intentions, or actions appropriate or inappropriate.   
'Explaining normativity: on rationality and the justification of reason' in 
Joseph Raz Engaging Reason, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 
66 
 
If as philosophers we identify normativity with reason, then we will tend to 
concentrate our attention on the directive side of normative standards, as opposed 
to their agent-appraisive function. And indeed, it is direction and our capacity to 
respond to it that has dominated much recent philosophical discussion of 
normativity. This is because in relation to reason it seems to be agent-direction 
rather than agent-appraisal that takes central stage. Standards of reason are indeed 
used to appraise agents; but they are used to appraise agents just in terms of their 
responsiveness to rational direction. So in relation to reason, it seems to be the 
directive side of normativity that is primary, the appraisive side to be explained in 
terms of the directive. 
 
Reason provides directions in the form of justifications. And rational justifications, 
it seems, are immediately justifications for or against forming and holding 
psychological attitudes, whether beliefs, or emotions, desires, intentions and 
 8 
 
various kinds of content-bearing motivations for action generally.
1
The 
justifications derive from possible objects of thought at which content-bearing 
attitudes might be directed, and from the various justification-providing properties 
those objects of thought might have – such as likelihood of truth in the case of 
belief, of goodness or desirability in the case of desires and other motivations. 
These justifications direct us towards the attitudes that they support, and away 
from the attitudes they oppose. 
 
Favourable rational appraisal makes use of terms such as ‘reasonable’, ‘sensible’, 
‘rational’ and so forth; and unfavourable rational appraisal correspondingly uses 
terms such as ‘foolish’, ‘less than sensible’, ‘unreasonable’, ‘irrational’, and the 
like. It is very plausible that to be subject to appraisal in such terms at all – to 
count at all either as reasonable or as unreasonable – is always to have some 
capacity to cognize and respond to justifications and the direction that they 
provide, whether that capacity be exercised competently or incompetently. Lower 
animals, such as sharks and mice, which are clearly quite incapable of recognizing 
or responding to justifications, equally clearly fall outside the sphere of reason.  In 
other words, they are a-rational, and no more capable of being genuinely foolish or 
unreasonable than they are capable of being sensible or reasonable. Lacking any 
capacity to respond to rational direction, such lower animals are beyond rational 
criticism or appraisal. 
 
Not only does rational appraisal presuppose some capacity in the agent appraised 
to respond to rational direction. Rational appraisal is also precisely for our 
responsiveness to such direction. The sensible or reasonable agent is just one who 
is responsive to rational direction – who is moved by justifications to form the 
attitudes justified; and an unreasonable agent is one who fails to respond properly 
to justifications – who despite having the general capacity to respond to reason, is 
unmoved by justifications, and who is moved to form those attitudes that the 
justifications oppose. The capacity addressed by standards of rational appraisal - 
the capacity for rationality or reasonableness - just is the capacity to respond to 
rational direction.   
 
If we identify all normativity purely and simply with reason, then we may be 
tempted to adopt the position that I shall call ‘ethical rationalism’. This view does 
not simply regard ethical standards as reasons – a claim I should myself wish to 
support - but claims that the capacity addressed and governed by ethical standards 
is simply the general capacity to respond to rational direction.
2
 According to the 
ethical rationalist, there is nothing more to ethical direction than general rational 
                                                 
1
As T.M. Scanlon puts it: Judgment-sensitive attitudes constitute the class of things for 
which reasons in the standard normative sense can sensibly be asked for or offered. What 
We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press 1998) p. 21 
 
2
Consider Scanlon's view of moral responsibility or our responsibility to ethical 
standards. The capacity addressed seems to be not much more than the general capacity 
for reason:  
 …"being responsible" is mainly a matter of the appropriateness of demanding 
reasons…  What We Owe to Each Other p. 22  
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direction as applied to moral questions; and ethical appraisal is entirely of our 
responsiveness to such rational direction. Hence for the ethical rationalist it is the 
directive aspect of normativity that is fundamental to ethical theory. 
 
But the identity of ethical normativity with reason is hardly trivial. For otherwise 
the ethical project of David Hume would be unintelligible – which it seems not to 
be. Hume certainly allows that ethical standards are normative for us; he supposes 
that ethical standards make a call on us to meet them, and support appraisal of us 
in terms of whether or not we meet the standards. But he denies that the call is that 
of reason, and that ethical appraisal is of us as reasonable or unreasonable.   
 
Actions may be laudable or blameable; but they cannot be reasonable or 
unreasonable: Laudable or blameable, therefore, are not the same with reasonable 
or unreasonable.  A Treatise of Human Nature p. 458 
 
Hume replaces the notion of reason in the theory of ethical normativity with that 
of merit. Merit is a particular form of personal goodness or admirability. It is 
admirability that takes the form of talent. In other words merit is admirability or 
excellence in relation to arts or skills. And for Hume moral admirability or virtue 
is just another form of talent. The supposed distinction between moral virtue and 
talent is, in Hume’s view, wholly verbal.
3
The moral person is good at morals and 
so admirable or estimable in moral terms as, say, the able singer is good at singing 
and so estimable in terms of standards supplied by the art of singing.   
 
The assimilation of virtue to talent, of moral admirability to a form of merit, tends 
to broaden the focus of a theory of ethical normativity from being narrowly on 
reason – which is what Hume intended. It also prevents the theory of ethical 
normativity from assuming a primacy of the directive over the appraisive. For to 
possess talent is obviously not in general a mode of being reasonable, just as to 
lack talent is not in general to be unreasonable. There are plenty of arts and skills 
that are not greatly dependent on, still less a function of our reason; consider, for 
example, a talent for song or ballet. And to be appraisable as good or bad in terms 
of an art or skill may or may not be to possess a capacity to respond to any 
particular form of direction, let alone to that provided by reason. Some talents may 
consist in a largely undirectable knack; and their exercise be largely an expression 
of that knack. Consider again wit, or the talent to amuse. 
 
How far merit appraisal is of our capacity to respond to any form of direction 
depends on the nature of the art or skill in question, and of the kinds of capacity 
which practice of the art or skill involves. The immediate question raised by the 
appeal to merit is the question that ethical rationalism assumes from the very start 
to have been answered – what kinds of capacity are involved in morality, and what 
kind of practice is it that involves their exercise? Is more involved than just some 
general capacity to respond to rational direction? What is it that we are appraising 
when we appraise people ethically? 
 
                                                 
3 See again Hume's An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, appendix IV, 
'Of some verbal disputes'.  
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Hume needed the appeal to merit because he had already denied himself any 
recourse to reason. And that is because Hume’s psychological theory committed 
him to a complete denial of the very possibility of any form of practical reason – 
of reason, that is, in a form governing what ethical standards centrally apply to, 
namely motivations and the actions which those motivations guide and explain. 
According to Hume, motivations are contentless feelings, akin to sensations of 
pain and pleasure.  
 
When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have 
no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more 
than five foot high.  A Treatise of Human Nature p. 415 
 
Motivations, as contentless feelings, are not attitudes towards some object of 
thought in terms of which they might be justified. So motivations and the actions 
they explain are, in Hume’s view, subject neither to rational direction nor to 
rational appraisal. Reason, to the extent that Hume admits the notion, is simply 
directive of belief.  
 
Even if we do not find this wholesale denial of practical reason credible, there is 
still a question how far ethical normativity in particular is a normativity of reason.  
For the view that laudable and blameable are not the same as reasonable or 
unreasonable is clearly right in the general case. As we have noted there can be 
merit and demerit in relation to arts and skills that does not consist in reason or 
unreason. We certainly can praise and criticize people other than as reasonable or 
unreasonable – for forms of excellence or its lack that are not a matter of 
rationality or reasonableness or its lack. And even in the ethical case it is not 
obvious that praise and criticism are as reasonable or unreasonable. For the most 
immediate terms of ethical appraisal are surely not ‘reasonable’ and 
‘unreasonable’, still less ‘sensible’ and ‘foolish’, but, exactly as Hume supposed, 
‘good’ and ‘bad’. Immoral people are bad people – that seems obvious. It is not 
quite so obvious that they are unreasonable, still less that they are foolish; which is 
why establishing that immorality is contrary to reason has in the past seemed to 
many a substantial philosophical problem. 
 
At the same time, Hume’s scepticism about practical reason is based on a 
psychology that renders very problematic any satisfactory theory of ethical 
direction. Hume certainly did not deny that ethical standards serve to direct us.  
Such a denial would have been quite incredible. But the form this direction took is 
left rather mysterious. For Hume, as we have noted, motivations are not content-
bearing attitudes formed in response to some object of thought – an object that 
might serve as justification for the attitudes. Motivations, for Hume, are just 
contentless feelings, that no are no more attitudes towards an object than is (say) a 
stab of pain; and, as we have seen, that is fundamental to his general scepticism 
about practical reason. But how is someone to be directed into or out of feeling a 
contentless sensation, such as a pain or pleasure? There is no satisfactory account 
of how mere feelings might be sensitive to normative direction.   
 
But it is very important to our conception of ethical appraisal, whether as good or 
as bad, that it really is of agents who are capable of ethical direction. Just as to be 
unreasonable, as opposed to falling a-rationally outside the sphere of reason as 
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might a shark or a mouse, an agent must have at least some capacity to respond to 
rational direction; so, too, to be genuinely immoral, it might be thought, an agent 
must have at least some capacity to understand and respond to ethical direction.   
 
Badness in terms of many arts or skills – being bad at them – may, when 
sufficiently pronounced, detach the talentless from any capacity even to be 
directed towards excellence. But immorality seems different. To be morally very 
bad arguably always presupposes some capacity for being directed ethically - and 
at the very least therefore some cognitive grasp at least of the kinds of ethical 
standard being disregarded. If that capacity is absent then one is not immoral or 
bad in moral terms. One falls outside the class of those who are morally 
appraisable. A shark is not morally bad any more than a shark is foolish. Quite 
incapable of being directed ethically, sharks fall outside morality just as they fall 
outside reason. 
 
We now have the basis of two contrary positions, occupying opposing extremes. 
The first is what I have called ‘ethical rationalism’. This certainly provides a 
theory of ethical direction - one taken from a general theory of rational direction. 
Yet nothing more is said about moral practice and about moral appraisal in relation 
to that practice than that the capacity involved and appraised is the capacity to 
receive and respond to rational direction. But if nothing more than that were 
involved, why would ethical appraisal be immediately intelligible in terms that are 
not obviously and immediately those of rational appraisal? Why does ethical 
appraisal immediately involve terms familiar from general merit appraisal, which 
takes the form of appraisal of agents as good or bad - terms which leave it to some 
degree a question whether immorality is ipso facto a form of folly or unreason? 
For Hume was perfectly right to note that where a person or action is concerned, 
being laudable or good is not the same as being reasonable. 
 
On the other extreme we have the reason-scepticism of Hume, which treats the 
appraisive function of ethical standards as primary. Ethical standards are 
introduced just as standards of merit or personal admirability. But the disavowal of 
any appeal to reason leaves a void as far as explaining ethical direction is 
concerned. Hume thought that he could accommodate the directiveness of ethical 
standards; and, in particular, that he could accommodate even the directiveness of 
obligation. But it is not clear that his appraisive model supplies, on its own, the 
required basis for explaining ethical direction. 
 
 
3.  Obligation and appraisal 
 
Positivising theories of moral obligation as directive law appeal to some 
distinctive form of direction associated with positive law – such as direction 
through legislative decree, or direction backed by threat of sanction. But it may be 
that to understand moral obligation as action-directive law we should appeal 
instead to a distinctive form of appraisal - and characterize the distinctively 
demanding direction provided by moral obligation in terms of that. 
 
Late scholasticism provides a theory of moral law as a wholly natural form of 
action-directive law - a theory that is not positivising. The theory constitutes a via 
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media between ethical rationalism with its prioritisation of normative direction, 
and reason-scepticism with its exclusive attention to normative appraisal. As 
natural law, moral obligation provides a form of rational direction, and so 
addresses motivation as a capacity to respond to that direction. But the peculiarly 
demanding and action-specific direction that comes with obligation is explained in 
terms of a theory of ethical appraisal, and by reference to capacities subject to that 
appraisal that go beyond a simple capacity to respond to rational direction. The 
theory of normative direction is a theory of practical reason. But this theory is 
informed by a theory of normative appraisal that goes beyond a simple theory of 
rationality and reason - a theory of appraisal elements of which survived, detached 
from the general theory of rational direction, to form Hume's theory of merit. 
 
Aquinas thought, just as did Hume, that moral obligation is linked to a negative 
form of moral appraisal. As for Hume, moral obligation is a standard to breach 
which is to be disadmirable or bad. Wrongdoing involves demerit. But, by contrast 
to Hume, the negative appraisal that relates to breach of moral obligation is not 
just ordinary negative evaluation, but takes a distinctive form - as moral blame. 
 
Blame for doing wrong is distinctively condemnatory as a criticism because it 
does not just detect a fault in the agent’s action, but condemns that fault as bad, 
and then attributes that fault so understood to the agent as their fault, condemning 
the agent himself. Not only was what they did bad, but it was bad of them to do it. 
And as Aquinas argued, this condemnation of the agent as bad to have done what 
he did involves a central and distinguishing human capacity - the capacity for 
freedom: 
 
Hence a human action is worthy of praise or blame in so far as it is good or bad. For 
praise and blame is nothing other than for the goodness or badness of his action to be 
imputed to someone. Now an action is imputed to an agent when it is within his 
power, so that he has dominion over the act. But this is the case with all actions 
involving the will: for it is through the will that man has dominion over his 
action...Hence it follows that good or bad in actions of the will alone justifies praise 
and blame; for in such actions badness, fault and blame come to one and the same.  
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, 2 q21 a 2, resp. (Turin: Marietti, 
1950) p. 122 
 
Hume did not recognize this capacity for freedom as of moral significance - which 
is why he reduced moral blame to a nothing more than a mere negative evaluation. 
But there is another difference between Aquinas and Hume. For Aquinas, moral 
blame is a form of rational criticism, and addresses a failure to follow a form of 
rational direction. This direction comes not as rational advice, but as rational 
demand. This is a distinctive form of direction that is identified by the special form 
of negative appraisal, moral blame, that is made of those who disregard the 
direction - who breach moral obligation. 
 
The directive aspect of normativity, just considered in itself, does not easily 
distinguish between obligation and advice. We can be strongly directed to do what 
is advisable just as we can be directed to do what is obligatory. In each case,  
direction can be conveyed in terms that imply marked criticism of those that 
disregard it. 'It would be foolish or deeply inadvisable not to do that', and 'Not to 
do that would be very bad and quite wrong'. What distinguishes obligation and 
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advice lies at the level of appraisal - the way in which failure to follow the rational 
direction is negatively appraised. In the case of duty or obligation, the negative 
appraisal does not allege folly or lack of sense. That is the criticism that meets 
disregard of advice. Rather the criticism takes the form of moral blame. And the 
message of moral blame is that the agent is a wrongdoer, and that in the absence of 
excuse the agent was therefore bad to have done what they did. 
 
So the direction given by moral obligation is located by the scholastic tradition 
within a general framework of rational direction. But the peculiar kind of rational 
direction involved is then explained in terms of a theory of appraisal - appraisal 
that is not simply of the agent’s capacity to respond to reason, but of how the agent 
exercises freedom. 
 
The general theory of rational direction takes motivations, the agent's decisions 
and intentions, to be directed at objects of thought - objects that specify various 
voluntary actions between which the agent must decide, and which he will perform 
on the basis of deciding to perform them. Thus I might have to decide between 
keeping a sum of money or giving it to someone else. Each voluntary action may 
have various reason-giving features that rationally support its performance. Thus 
keeping the money allows me to spend it on myself. Giving it to another might 
repay a debt. 
 
 
Motivation       Voluntary action 
 
 






  justify with a given force Reason-giving features 
        (e.g. repays a debt) 
 
 
Besides these reason-giving features and the justification they provide, we need 
the idea of various kinds of directive force with which these features might support 
or justify both the voluntary actions that possess them and the motivations for 
performing these voluntary actions. The difference between advisability and 
obligatoriness is then explained as a difference in respect of justificatory force - a 
difference between recommendation and demand - that is unpacked, in turn, in 
terms of a theory of appraisal. To disregard the force of advice is to be criticized as 
foolish or less than sensible. To disregard the force of obligation is to act badly so 
that, where there is no excuse such as from ignorance or lack of control, it was bad 
of one so to act. 
 
In the practical sphere the pair 'sensible' and 'foolish' shares with 'good' and 'bad' a 
set of common properties. Each pair similarly applies both to voluntary actions 
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and to prior motivations to act, and in a way that both conveys direction, and that 
serves to appraise people for their response to such direction. 
 
The terms 'sensible' or 'foolish' can be used of voluntary actions to pick them out 
as possessing features that support or oppose their performance and leave that 
performance advisable or inadvisable. But they also apply to the motivations to 
perform those voluntary actions; and then they track the application to those 
motivations of the justificatory force generated by their voluntary objects. If it is 
sensible to give the money, then to intend or to be motivated to give the money is 
sensible too. And correspondingly if it is foolish to hand the money over, then it is 
foolish to be motivated to hand over the money. Finally those terms sensible and 
foolish serve to appraise agents for their responsiveness to the force of the 
justification provided, both for voluntary actions and the prior motivations to 
perform them. Agents who are sensible act and are motivated to act in ways that 
are sensible. 
 
But the same pattern applies to ‘morally good’ and ‘morally bad’. The terms can 
similarly be used to pick out voluntary actions as possessing features that support 
or oppose their performance. And just as with ‘sensible’ and ‘advisable’ this 
support applies also to the motivations to perform those actions. Giving the money 
might be morally good because it helps another or fulfills a promise. And if it is 
good to give the money, it is correspondingly good to intend or be motivated to 
give the money; if morally bad or wrong to give the money, then it is equally bad 
or wrong to intend to give the money. And finally ‘good’ and ‘bad’ similarly serve 
to appraise agents for their responsiveness to the normative support or lack of it 
for various voluntary actions and the motivations to perform them. 
 
So ‘morally good' and 'morally bad' are used in the same way as 'sensible' and 
'foolish' in relation to objects of thought, to communicate the support given by 
them to psychological attitudes. And they are used in the same way in arguments 
to support the formation of motivations directed at those objects of thought. Both 
'bad/wrong' and 'foolish' are used to convey strong direction in a way that we 
immediately treat and understand as equally argumentatively conclusive in each 
case. To point out that doing A would be foolish is plainly not a merely 
preliminary step in a rational argument against doing A that would need to be 
completed by somehow showing that (therefore) it would be wrong or bad of one 
to do A. But nor is pointing out that it would be bad or wrong of one to do A 
merely the first step in a rational argument against doing A that would need to be 
completed by somehow showing that (therefore) it would be foolish of one to do 
A. Once either the folly or the wrongness and badness of an action has been 
established, each is on its own enough to convey an argumentative and rational 
rejection of the action as an option. Advisability and obligatoriness is each a 
genuine force of reason, and neither needs to be buttressed by the other.  
 
There is in late scholasticism a systematic project of using this appraisal-based 
account of moral obligation and the rational direction it provides to detach moral 
obligation from divine commands, and so from the tie to legislation and sanction 




Since even if God never gave any command about the matter, it would still be bad 
to kill a human being without reason, to show contempt for one’s superiors, or to 
expose oneself to clear danger of death, therefore even if natural law did not do so 
by way of any particular commandment given by God, natural law would still 
forbid such actions. … for by the natural law we understand that on account of 
which some action is good or bad independently of any positive law, and so insofar 
as there would still be very many good and bad actions even if there were no divine 
commands, there would still be a natural law even in the absence of such 
commands.  John Punch commentary on Scotus on the decalogue, distinctio 
37 in Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, vol. 7, Luke Wadding ed. (Lyons, 1639), 
pp. 857-77. 
 
Even Suarez, trying to defend a dependence of moral obligation on divine 
legislation, remains within the same framework of appraisal-centred natural law – 
a framework he shares with the many early modern Catholic disbelievers in such 
dependence. Unlike Anscombe, Suarez does not appeal to divine commands to 
explain what moral obligations are. He and his opponents already share the same 
conception of what moral obligations are. They involve a justificatory force 
identified by a distinctive kind of negative appraisal. So Suarez is quite happy to 
assume the very notion of obligation to characterize the content of the decree of 
the divine will necessary, in his view, to the generation of moral obligations. The 
content of the divine decision that generates moral obligation, and that in Suarez's 
view is necessary to its very existence, is that a given action be morally obligatory. 
And, again, when Suarez attempts to argue for the dependence of moral obligation 
on divine legislation, he does so within the terms of an appraisal-centred theory, 
by alleging that without that legislation, there would not exist a peculiar form of 
badness - that which he terms praevaricatio or transgression, and which is in his 
view is necessary to genuine wrong-doing.  
 
I therefore reply that in a human action there is indeed some goodness or badness 
by virtue of the object positively aimed at, in as much as that object is compatible 
or incompatible with right reason, so that by right reason the action can be 
counted as bad, and a fault and blameworthy in that regard, apart from any 
relation to law proper.  But beyond this a human action has a particular character 
of being good or bad in relation to God, when we add divine law forbidding or 
decreeing, and in respect of that the human action counts in a particular way as a 
fault or blameworthy in relation to God by virtue of its breaching of the genuine 
law of God himself, which particular badness Paul seems to have referred to by 
the name of transgression when he said, 'Where there is not law, neither is there 
any transgression'. Francisco Suarez, De legibus ac legislatore deo, in Opera 
Omnia volume 5 Charles Berton ed., (Paris: Louis Vives 1856) p. 110 (my 
emphases) 
 
Whether or not Suarez's position is convincing, it is clear that moral obligation and 
its directiveness is still being characterized, even by him, in terms of a 'particular 
badness'. The peculiarly demanding direction that constitutes moral obligation is 
being characterised in terms of a distinctive form of moral appraisal. 
 
The natural law tradition views moral law as prior to positive law, and moral 
obligation or duty as prior to positive legal obligation or duty. But there is more to 
the tradition than just that priority. In characterizing moral obligation, rather than 
appeal immediately to some distinctively legal form of direction, such as might be 
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involved in positive law, the Catholic natural law tradition came to view legal 
direction as indeed distinctive – but in ways that had to be understood in terms of a 
theory of ethical appraisal, and as involving a special form of the general morality 
of virtue and vice. Anscombe and Williams, by contrast, agree on a very different 
and positivising view of moral obligation. Despite the many other differences 
between them, together these two philosophers exemplify, in a strikingly similar 
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